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Abstract 
Decentralization is meant to improve public services, but relatively few studies examine this 
question empirically. We explore the effects of decentralization on education, health and 
agriculture outcomes in Ethiopia using an original database covering all of the country’s woredas 
(i.e. local governments), which will itself eventually be an important contribution of this paper. 
Ethiopia is an interesting case study for two big reasons: (i) It is the fastest growing country in 
Africa and one of the 5 fastest-growing in the world; and (ii) Since decentralizing the country has 
made significant progress towards its MDGs and in reducing poverty. We show that 
decentralization improved net enrolments in education, access to basic services in health such as 
antenatal care, contraception, vaccination rates, and deliveries by skilled birth attendants, and 
contributed to greater agricultural productivity in cereals, vegetables, enset, coffee and fruits. 
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1. Introduction 
With 90 million inhabitants, 90+ ethnic and linguistic groups, and a sustained growth rate 
of over 10% in recent years, Ethiopia is a big, diverse, important developing country.  The 
country’s social and geographic diversity, combined with a federal structure and sincere 
decentralization5 pursued since the early 1990s, make it an ideal context in which to study the 
effects of decentralization on social services and outcomes in key sectors such as education, 
health and agriculture, as well as their distribution.  This paper does so with an original database 
of woreda (read “municipal”) economic, social and demographic characteristics that the authors 
painstakingly constructed from official sources. 
The evidence that Ethiopia can offer is especially welcome in light of the inconclusive 
nature of the empirical evidence accumulated over the past four decades.  This is especially true 
of the older decentralization literature from the 1960s-1990s.  Consider the broadest surveys of 
that work. Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis (1983) note that decentralization has usually 
disappointed its partisans. Most developing countries implementing decentralization experienced 
serious administrative problems. Although few comprehensive evaluations of the benefits and 
costs of decentralization efforts have been conducted, those that were attempted indicate limited 
success in some countries but not others. A decade and a half later, surveys by Piriou-Sall 
(1998), Manor (1999) and Smoke (2001) are slightly more positive, but with caveats about the 
strength of the evidence in decentralization’s favor. Manor notes that the evidence, though 
extensive, is still incomplete, but ends his study with the opinion that ‘while decentralization …is 
no panacea, it has many virtues and is worth pursuing’. Smoke, by contrast, finds the evidence 
                                               
5 Sincere decentralization is defined as reform that effectively devolves power and resources from central 
to subnational levels of government, as opposed to insincere reforms that leave power resources at the 
center.  For a more detailed discussion, see Faguet (2012). 
mixed and anecdotal, and asks whether there is empirical justification for pursuing 
decentralization at all. Given the sheer size of this literature, the lack of progress is surprising. 
By contrast, more recent empirical studies distinguish themselves in two important ways: 
(i) They are often technically more sophisticated than the older, more case-study based literature, 
as developing-country datasets have improved enormously over recent decades; and (ii) They are 
generally more positive about decentralization’s potential. Only five recent studies that we know 
of address the link between decentralization and substantive outcomes directly and with rigorous 
quantitative evidence. These include Escaleras and Register (2012), who find that fiscal 
decentralization is associated with lower natural disaster death rates, implying more effective 
preparation and/or responses to natural disasters by countries with decentralized governments. 
Clark (2009) applies regression discontinuity to a natural experiment from Britain to show that 
schools that opt out of the centralized educational regime – in effect decentralizing themselves – 
enjoy large increases in student achievement. Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2008) find that 
decentralization of school control from central to provincial governments in Argentina had a 
positive impact on student test scores. The poorest, however, did not gain, and indeed may have 
lost. Barankay and Lockwood (2007) find that greater decentralization of education to Swiss 
cantons is associated with higher educational attainment, especially for boys.  And Faguet and 
Sánchez (2013) find that decentralization improved enrollment rates in public schools and access 
of the poor to public health services in Colombia. In both sectors, small increases in own-shares 
of spending led to surprisingly large increases in the access of the poor.  The evidence implies 
that decentralization provided local officials with the information and incentives required to 
allocate resources responsively according to voters’ needs, and improve the impact of public 
expenditures. This study hopes to add empirical evidence from a low income country with large, 
important decentralization and public investment programs, where results are potentially 
significant. 
Ethiopia is a particularly good context in which to study the decentralized provision of 
primary services for three reasons: (1) The country’s size and recent development experience 
give it a natural importance in the development community; (2) Its geographic and socio-cultural 
diversity are amongst the highest in the world, providing natural sources of variation that a study 
such as this can exploit analytically; and (3) Local services are supported by the Promotion of 
Basic Services program, the biggest donor-financed program in the world. 
Ethiopia has achieved impressive development results in recent years. That progress 
includes rapid and significant improvements in basic service delivery indicators.  An Overseas 
Development Institute study  (2010) noted that Ethiopia is making the third-fastest improvements 
of any country towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The latest 
Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey data show that child mortality has fallen from 123 per 
thousand in 2005 to 88 in 2010, and primary net enrollment rates rose from 68 percent in 
2004/2005 to 82 percent in 2009/2010. Such progress on basic service delivery is coupled with 
an impressive growth record over the past decade. GDP grew on average 11 percent per year 
during 2004/5-2009/10, according to official estimates. Initially led by agriculture, growth has 
become more broad-based, with a rising contribution from the mining, services and 
manufacturing sectors.  While growth has slowed recently, it still remains among the highest in 
the world. Based on official data, the population below the national absolute poverty line fell 
from 38.7 percent in 2004/2005 to 29.6 percent in 2011. Ethiopia achieved the MDG-4 (Child 
Mortality) target earlier this year, ahead of schedule, and appears to be on track to reach the other 
MDGs by 20156. 
Ethiopia is also home to a great diversity of ecological zones and ethnic and linguistic 
groups.  Its vast system of mountains and highland plateaus is bisected by the Great Rift Valley, 
itself surrounded by lowland steppes and semi-deserts.  In the east are remote deserts containing 
some of the hottest human settlements on earth, while to the south there are tropical forests.  
With 93 officially recognized mother tongues and 98 ethnicities by the Ethiopian census, the 
country is also one of the most ethno-culturally diverse societies on earth.  Detailed information 
on such environmental and social characteristics disaggregated to woreda level makes Ethiopia a 
rich context for the study of a broad range of development issues. 
Decentralization is henceforth defined as the devolution by central government of 
authority over specific functions, together with the administrative, political and economic 
attributes that these entail (e.g., tax-raising, expenditure, and decision-making powers), to 
democratic regional and local governments that are independent of the center within a legally 
delimited geographic and functional domain. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section two discusses the Ethiopian decentralization program within the broader historical 
context of its long imperial, centralizing tradition, and provides descriptive statistics for public 
investment flows to education, health and agricultural services. Section three discusses the 
dataset and presents our methodology. Section four examines decentralization’s effects on 
services and outcomes in the same three sectors, as well as their distribution, with econometric 
evidence. Section five concludes. 
                                               
6 UNICEF 2013  Committing to Child Survival: A Promise Renewed. Progress Report 2013 , New York, UNICEF. 
2. Centralization and decentralization in Ethiopia 
2.1  History and background 
The ethnic composition of Ethiopia is the result of a turbulent history. As it consolidated 
itself during the medieval period, the country was comprised primarily of the Tigray, Agaw and 
Amhara peoples. With Menelik II’s ascension to the throne in 1889, a period of territorial 
expansion began, whose base was the province of Shoa in the current region of Amhara. Areas 
consisting of today’s Beneshangul-Gemuz, Gambella, Southern Nations and Nationalities, Afar, 
Oromia and Somali regions were brought under the feudal system of the Ethiopian empire. 
Following the battle of Adwa in 1896 and the resulting European recognition of Ethiopian 
statehood, a series of border treaties with the surrounding colonial powers were signed. The 
modern Ethiopian state was born. 
Relations between the newly integrated areas and the historic center of the empire were 
troubled.  Menelik sent governors from the center to administer the periphery, but owing to the 
structural weakness of the center, successive Ethiopian governments did not command effective 
control over the peripheries. Similarly, exploitative economic policies caused visible 
marginalization, relative under-development, and less integration among the border regions 
within Ethiopia.7 This hold of the center over the peripheries continued to increase. According to 
noted Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewde: 
The period after 1941 witnessed the apogee of absolutism. The tentative beginnings in 
this direction of the pre-1935 years matured into untrammeled autocracy. The power of 
the state reached a limit unprecedented in Ethiopian history.8 
 
                                               
7 Mulugeta, Allehone, Issues of Security and Conflict, in the Ethiopian Frontiers: Notes on State Policies and 
Strategies, in Report of Ethiopia National Workshop - Conflict in the Horn: Prevention and Resolution, (OSSREA 
Publications), (2002). 
8 Zewde, Bahru, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1974, Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 
(1991). 
The revised constitution of 1955 solidified the absolute powers of the emperor, claiming “His 
dignity… inviolable and His power… indisputable”. It also entrenched Amharic as sole the 
official language and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as the national religion.  
The period of socialist rule (1974-1991) saw no diminution in the center’s hold over the 
peripheries and no change in the prevailing economic policies of exploitation. Despite the 
regime’s appeal to a socialist ideology, the Derg was identified with an “Amhara suppresser‟ by 
the nationalist liberation movements.9 Any conduct promoting ethnic individualism, and thereby 
challenging the state’s integrity, was outlawed. 
The victory of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front over the Derg in 
1991 saw the reversal of over a hundred years of ethnic homogenization. As Chistopher Clapman 
says: 
The overthrow of the Mengistu government in May 1991 amounted to more than the 
collapse of a particular regime. It effectively marked the failure of a project, dating back 
to Menelik’s accession in 1889 of creating a ‘modern’ and centralized Ethiopian state 
around a Shoan core.10 
 
Ethnic federalism now came to the fore in Transitional Charter, which allowed the rights to self-
determination of the country’s various “nations and nationalities”.  Like the Charter, a new 
constitution in 1995 recognized the rights of ethnic self-determination up to succession. It also 
created a federal government with nine regional states divided along ethno-lingustic lines – 
Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Beneshangul-Gemuz, South Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples, Gambella, and Harari. 
                                               
9 Weldemariam, Alemayehu F, Greater Ethiopia: Evolution of a Pluralist Politico-Legal System in a 
Pluralist Polity, Department of Polictial Science, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Leiden 
University, (2011). 
10 Clapham, Christopher, “Ethnicity and the National Question in Ethiopia”, in Peter Woodward and 
Murray Forsyth (eds.) Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and its Alternatives, 
(Brookfield: Darmouth publishing co.), (1994). 
Economic integration and equitable development become a primary focus of the new 
government.  Meles Zenawi, the president of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
declared in 1997 that: 
It is only through fast economic growth that is broadly shared by the population that we 
can hope for sustainable peace. And, therefore, one of the most important pillars of our 
program is fast economic growth that is equitable and broadly shared among the 
population.11 
 
The government adopted a policy of affirmative action towards developing regions 
whereby Beneshangul-Gemuz, Gambella, Afar and Somali would be provided preferential 
treatment in terms of budget allocation and increased enrollment in higher education. Even now, 
however, developing regions still remain to be fully integrated into the economy of the Ethiopian 
state. The legacy of centralization left few residents of today’s developing regions involved in 
running their region’s administrative structures. 
Until recently there remained little investment in social and physical infrastructure.  
Slowly, the emergence of local native elite officially in charge of the regions, better investment 
in education, health, infrastructure and others have shown the positive outcomes of the 
federalization of Ethiopia.12 The preferential treatment of previously disadvantaged ethnic 
groups within Ethiopia is helping to create a more equitable distribution for development to take 
place. 
Decentralization of political, administrative and fiscal authority to regional and local 
governments has been fundamental to this affirmative action strategy. The Government has a 
strong commitment to decentralization and building a federal state, as enshrined in the 1995 
Federal Constitution. While the first wave of decentralization started only 20 years ago, the 
                                               
11 Meles Zenawi, “Premier’s speech at Butare National University in Rwanda”, in The Ethiopian Herald, 
(December 13, 1997). 
12 Adegehe, Asnake, Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia : a comparative study of the Somali and 
Benishangul-Gumuz regions, (2009). 
process should be seen as a work in progress for which the underpinning institutional 
arrangements for success are evolving and continue to require focused support. 
2.2  The Ethiopian decentralization program 
To date, Ethiopia has seen two rounds of decentralization. The first round (devolution) 
took place during the transitional period from 1991 to 1994. This Proclamation devolved state 
powers to geographically-defined ethno-linguistic groups and associated pieces of legislation 
were also passed creating regional and woreda (district) councils. As necessary, regions could 
decide to establish zones as intermediaries between regional and district administrations. In 
addition to giving them the right to self-determination, these new regional units were granted a 
range of executive, legislative, and judicial powers within their defined regions, and exercised 
jurisdiction over matters of social and economic development as well as basic service delivery. 
Accordingly, regions were to create the necessary internal institutional arrangements, including: 
a council; an executive committee; a judicial administration office; a public prosecution office; 
an audit office; a police and security office; and a service and development committee.  
Proclamation No. 7/1992 stipulated the regional governing units' revenue sources; these 
included: tax revenues derived within their jurisdictions; fiscal transfers from the central 
government; domestic borrowing; and other sources of income. The latter category was specified 
in Proclamation No. 33/1992. However, due to capacity constraints, the regional governments 
were yet unable to carry out their revenue assignments; as such, they were highly-dependent on 
grants from the central government to meet their new expenditure obligations in the social 
sectors. 
In spite of what appears to be a rather elaborate set of governing arrangements, these new 
regional governments remained subordinate to the central government. While the regional 
councils were accountable to citizens living within their regional borders, legally they were also 
responsible to Council of Representatives of the central government. 
The promulgation of the 1995 Federal Constitution signified the beginning of Ethiopia's 
second round of decentralization. The Constitution affirmed the roles and functions of federal vs. 
regional government. While the federal government retained authority over a broad range of 
functions and responsibilities (e.g., fiscal and monetary policy, international trade), the regions 
and woredas were given responsibility for ensuring basic service delivery in their respective 
jurisdictions. The federal government retained authority over setting policies and standards in 
each of the major social service delivery sectors. 
In 2002, decentralization was extended to the woreda level with woreda governments 
expected to take on the bulk of service delivery responsibilities. Woredas receive block grants 
from their respective regional governments which, like the federal-regional grants, are also 
governed by formulas set by the regional governments and use broadly similar methodologies to 
those used in federal-regional grants. 
2.3  Descriptive statistics 
 The resource implications of this second round of decentralization were significant. Table 
1 shows the evolution of federal block grants (FBGs) to regions over time.  Regions further 
devolve a large portion of these grants to woredas, although detailed data on this is not yet 
available.13  We see that FBGs rose from 13% of total federal expenditures in 1999/00 to 40% in 
2012/13, even as total federal expenditure more than tripled.  The result is a huge increase in 
funds available to regions in excess of 300%.  Interestingly, FBGs fell as a proportion of total 
regional expenditures from a peak of 88% to just over half, as new central transfers came on 
                                               
13 Data on woreda-level transfers and expenditures are currently only available for 2008-2011, and so 
omitted here.  The next version of this paper should fully incorporate woreda-level data from 2001-2012. 
stream and subnational governments developed their own tax bases, implying even more 
resources for regions and woredas. 
Table 1: Federal block grants (FBGs) to regions 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, National Bank of Ethiopia 
 N.B. Years are according to the Gregorian (i.e. Western), and not Ethiopian, calendar. 
How have subnational governments spent these increasing flows?  Figure 1 shows the 
sectoral breakdown for a typical year, in this case 2011.  Education takes the largest share at 
62%, followed by agriculture and health in a distant near-tie for second place, at 18% and 17% 
respectively.  Together these three sectors account for 97% of total expenditure, with expenditure 
on water & sanitation and roads summing to only 3%.  This broadly accords with the pattern of 
Year 
(Ethiopian 
calendar)
Federal block 
grant to 
regions (USD 
millions)
Total federal 
government 
expenditures 
(USD millions)
FBG as % of 
federal 
expenditures
FBG as % of 
total regional 
expenditures
1993/94 1,408
1994/95 1,513
1995/96 1,498
1996/97 445 1,605 28% 75%
1997/98 444 1,645 27% 78%
1998/99 414 2,029 20% 77%
1999/00 299 2,259 13% 65%
2000/01 426 2,221 19% 77%
2001/02 450 2,129 21% 77%
2002/03 527 2,147 25% 75%
2003/04 583 2,614 22% 79%
2004/05 635 2,616 24% 79%
2005/06 815 2,518 32% 79%
2006/07 1,065 3,067 35% 88%
2007/08 1,464 3,756 39% 85%
2008/09 1,589 3,940 40% 86%
2009/10 1,517 4,116 37% 80%
2010/11 1,587 4,207 38% 81%
2011/12 1,721 4,689 37% 61%
2012/13 1,954 4,895 40% 54%
expenditure across developing countries, which typically prioritize education and health above 
other sectors. 
Figure 1: Woreda-level expenditures by sector, 2011 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
 Have such expenditures affected education and health outcomes of interest?  Are they 
having an effect on Ethiopia’s development more broadly?  Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
education expenditures at the regional and woreda levels (left axis), plotted against the net 
enrollment rate (right axis) between 1993-2012.  We see a notable rise in education expenditure 
throughout this period, with a clear acceleration after about 2005, when regional governments 
begin devolving significant sums to woredas.  This is associated with a steady, four-fold rise in 
the net enrollment rate from under 20% to over 80%, again with an upward surge in 2005. 
Figure 2: Growth in subnational education expenditures & net enrollment rate, 1993-2012 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
 Figures 3-6 plot the same expenditure data against changes in the rates of vaccination 
against measles and DPT, the rate of detection of TB, and the fertility rate.  The data for these 
variables are being cleaned and corroborated, and still contain gaps and erratic features that we 
are working to fix.  But even so the overall patterns are striking.  In figure 3 we see the measles 
vaccination rate, previously stagnant around 30%, begin a secular rise in 2003 from 27% to 68% 
by 2011.  This coincides with Ethiopia’s second round of decentralization to woredas.  The DPT 
vaccination rate (figure 4) similarly begins rising in 2002, from 28% to 65% in 2010.  The rate of 
detection of TB (figure 5) shows an even longer and more dramatic rise, from 11% in 1995 to 
68% in 2011.  And Ethiopia’s fertility rate – a variable that, across countries and cultures, moves 
slowly in response to broad demographic and economic factors – declines markedly from 7.1 
live births per woman in 193 to 4.8 in 2011 (figure 6).  In all of these cases, greater 
decentralization of health expenditure appears be to associated with improving indicators of 
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health system outputs, such as vaccination rates, as well as substantive outcomes, such as 
fertility. 
Figure 3: Growth in subnational health expenditures & measles vaccination rate, 1993-2012 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
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Figure 4: Growth in subnational health expenditures & DPT vaccination rate, 1993-2012 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
Figure 5: Growth in subnational health expenditures & TB detection rate, 1993-2012 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
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Figure 6: Growth in subnational health expenditures & declining fertility, 1993-2012 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
 Unfortunately, the data for agriculture is in a worse state than other sectors, and so figure 
7 only plots the 2008-2011 period.  Just as in health and education, agricultural expenditures 
increased rapidly over this period. Concomitant with this increase, the percentage of fields that 
use extension services more than doubled.  This occurs entirely within the second phase of 
Ethiopian decentralization, to woredas. 
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Figure 7: Growth in subnational agriculture expenditures & extension services, 2008-2011 
 
 Source: Ministry of Finance & Economic Development 
 What do these descriptive statistics tell us?  Firm conclusions must await the more 
rigorous evidence presented below.  The preceding figures are no more than suggestive.  But 
what they suggest is that rapidly rising decentralized expenditures in education, health and 
agriculture have led to significant increases in public sector outputs, such as education 
enrollments and vaccinations against communicable diseases, as well as substantive outcomes 
such as fertility.  And for some of these indicators, improvements accelerate from the early-
2000s onwards, with Ethiopia’s second round of decentralization to woredas.  Are these changes 
due to decentralization itself, or to the increase in expenditures that coincided with 
decentralization?  We cannot distinguish between these possibilities from the descriptive 
statistics above, but our more detailed, analytical results below can. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1  Data 
One reason an analysis of this sort has not been undertaken until now is the absence of 
woreda-level data on local economic, demographic, fiscal and other characteristics.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to overstate the difficulty of doing subnational empirical work on Ethiopia.  When we 
began this project, relatively little subnational data was collected, the data was often of poor 
quality, and few attempts were made to systematize the results into any obviously comparable 
framework.  A few illustrations are telling.  Fiscal data on subnational expenditures in health, 
education, agriculture, water, and roads were until very recently available only for EFY 2003.  
Their geographic identifying codes and names did not match those of census data, whose 
geographic codes and names vary in unpredictable but pervasive ways from fiscal data.  The last 
census counted some 740 woredas, zones, and regions, but the fiscal dataset included more than 
850.  Consolidating these two yielded a dataset of 989 subnational units, 250 more than in the 
census.  Many woredas were listed under the same name, and geographic codes in both data sets 
were not unique. Missing data abounded. 
The database that the team has constructed includes woreda-level data from five 
ministries – Health, Education, Agriculture, Water and Energy, and Finance and Economic 
Development – as well as the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), the Disaster Risk Management 
and Food Security Sector of the Ministry of Agriculture. As standardization of woreda codes and 
the transliteration of Amharic names into Latin script is not yet consistent between ministries in 
Ethiopia, much time was dedicated to matching woredas from various sources into a single 
format. For consistency, the team used the Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia (2007) 
codes as its base. 
The database includes year-on-year expenditures by sector, and key results by sector, and 
information on ethnicity, poverty, rainfall, frequency of droughts, and a number of other control 
variables.  Regional data on per capita capital expenditures and zonal data on crop yields have 
also been included.  Moving forward, we intend to update the database yearly, with yearly results 
from each sector incorporated as they become available.  Building the database required for this 
report has required a huge amount of work and improvisation on the part of the team undertaking 
the empirical analysis.  It is our hope that this dataset will in time become a useful tool for 
researchers and students elsewhere in Africa and beyond. 
3.2  Methodology 
Our primary objective is to assess the effect of woreda-level expenditures for 
decentralized sectors on key sector outputs and outcomes. Ethiopian fiscal rules create a strong 
association between woreda-level spending in agriculture, education, and health, and key service 
outputs such as the numbers of agriculture extension workers, teachers, and health extension 
workers.  The causal chain between our right hand side variables (“inputs”) and our left hand 
side variables (“outputs” or “outcomes”, depending on data availability) is depicted in figure 8 
below.  It is useful to keep these relationships in mind when interpreting the econometric results 
that follow. 
Figure 8: Conceptual model of causality for woreda expenditure 
 
 
Our intention is to use panel regressions to investigate the effects of decentralization on 
outputs and outcomes in education, health and agriculture.  But the current lack of woreda level 
data from the pre-decentralization period restricts us to simple time-series estimations with 
nationally aggregated data over the past 20 years, which includes both pre and post-
decentralization data.  We then corroborate these results with woreda-level data from 2008-2011 
inclusive, all of which is in the post-decentralization period.  Here we estimate cross-time pooled 
regressions in order to evaluate the impact of per capita sector expenditure, controlling for 
rural/urban percentage and ethnicity, on various output and outcome variables of interest.  For 
agriculture, where reliable local outcome data are unavailable, we revert to zonal level data on 
outcomes. By taking the average per capita woreda spending on agriculture as a proxy for 
services offered by agriculture extension workers, zonal outcome data can be used to assess 
spending effectiveness. Data constraints prevent us from analyzing water supply and roads. But 
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the latter two sectors account for only 3% of total woreda-level spending, implying that our 
sectoral focus is appropriate. Additionally, national household surveys such as the Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS) and the Agriculture Sample Survey are used to complement our 
analysis from the woreda-level database.  Results using household data confirm those from our 
woreda database, which relies on administrative data. 
The analysis consists of three key stages.  Stage I is a simple time-series OLS estimation 
as follows: 
 Ot = a + b1Et + b2Dt + b3Tt + b4Et*Dt + et (1) 
Where O captures key education and health outcomes, expressed as rates; E is expenditures in 
each sector; D is a dummy variable that equals 0 before Ethiopia decentralized to woredas and 1 
after; and T is a simple trend variable, all subscripted by year t.  We expect sectoral expenditures 
to positively affect sectoral outcomes, and hence to be statistically significant with the correct 
sign.  If decentralization affects outcomes generally, through administrative, political, or other 
channels, then we expect the dummy variable to be significant and larger in effect.  But if 
decentralization’s main channel of influence is via local discretion over resource allocation, as 
opposed to more general effects, then we expect the interaction term to take over significance 
when it is added to the model. 
Stage II follows the approach of Faguet (2012) and Faguet and Sánchez (2013), 
examining the relationship between woreda-level spending in each sector on results in those 
sectors. We estimate 
            lnOmt = a + zlnEmt + bRm + dCm+ ηlnKmt + τt + emt (2) 
where lnO captures key outcomes in each sector through variables such as the net enrollment rate 
or antenatal care usage.  E is yearly expenditure per capita in the relevant sector; K is capital 
expenditure per capita; R is the percentage of rural population in each woreda; τ is a year 
variable to control for the time series effect in this cross time pooled data set; and C is a vector of 
demographic controls, including population percentages of certain historically disadvantaged 
ethnicities that we focuses on, indexed by woreda m and year t.  R and C are census variables, 
and thus treated as time-invariant. 
Log transformations are very commonly used in order to reduce the effect of extreme 
values on results.  But interpreting the coefficients of log-transformed data is not 
straightforward. Log transformations are often useful for data that exhibit right (positive) 
skewness, and where the variability of residuals increases for larger values of the dependent 
variable. When a variable is log transformed, note that simply taking the anti-log of your 
parameters will not properly back transform into the original metric used.14 
We also estimate a linear version of (2), as follows: 
             Omt = a + zEmt + bRm + dCm + ηKmt + τt + emt . (3) 
We further add a quadratic term for expenditure to (3), in order to check for decreasing marginal 
returns, as follows: 
            Omt = a + zEmt + λEmt2 + bRm + dCm+ ηKmt+ τt + emt (4) 
For all the above equations, it is expected δO/δE ≥ 0 and δO/δK ≥ 0.  Similarly δlnO/δlnE 
≥ 0 (that the first partial derivatives) while in Equation (3) δ2O/δ2E ≤ 0 (the second partial 
derivate).  The expected results imply a positive association between the dependent variable and 
the independent variable, per capita woreda expenditures in each sector. 
                                               
14 For a clear, concise treatment of this topic, see Jing Yang Interpreting Coefficients in 
Regression with Log-Transformed Variables, StatNews #83, June 2012, Cornell Statistical 
Consulting Unit, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.  Available at: http://www.cscu.cornell.edu. 
 
Finally, stage III compensates for a lack of woreda-level data on agriculture by using 
household-level DHS data to estimate a Probit limited dependent variable model, using the 
following specification: 
Pi,q = a + ρzlnEmt + dVm + emt       (5) 
where Pi,q  is whether household “i” in quintile “q” adopts improved techniques, measured as “1” 
for “yes” and “0” for “no”.   Em,t is per capita expenditure on agricultural extension workers, and 
Vm,t is a vector of control variables, including rainfall. 
 
4. Results 
We eventually intend use panel regressions to investigate the effects of decentralization 
on outputs and outcomes in education, health and agriculture.  But the current lack of woreda 
level data from the pre-decentralization period restricts us to simple time-series estimations with 
nationally aggregated data over the past 20 years, and full panel estimations using woreda-level 
data from 2008-2011 inclusive.  Realizing this approach is distinctly second-best, we verify these 
findings with household data from DHS 2005 and 2011 surveys, where we use limited dependent 
variable (primarily probit) regressions to investigate health and education outcomes.  These 
results corroborate ourmain findings, but are not presented here for lack of space.  We hope that 
this combination of results can tell us something of interest about the effects of decentralization 
on public service provision in Ethiopia.  But we do not pretend that our results are ideal, nor a 
direct test of the questions we want answered.  With luck, better estimations will be possible 
soon. 
National	results	
What do national regression results reveal about the links between decentralization and 
improvements in Ethiopia's public services? Table 2 contains results from our national database 
for education. The regression in the first column shows that education expenditure increases the 
net enrollment rate, but decentralization to woredas has an independent, statistically significant 
effect. Adding a trend variable removes significance from these first two terms. But when we 
interact education expenditures with the woreda decentralization dummy (column 3), all four 
terms are significant. Our interpretation of these results is that it is decentralized expenditures 
that are driving improvements in Ethiopia's enrollment rates, as distinct from education 
expenditures more generally, or some other – perhaps political or administrative – aspect of 
decentralization. 
Table 2: Decentralization’s effect on education outputs 
 
Table 3 shows results for health. In column 1 we see that health expenditures appear to 
drive improvements in DPT vaccinations, but the decentralization dummy is insignificant. 
Adding a trend variable does not alter this result, and the trend variable is also insignificant. 
When we add an interaction term for health expenditures and woreda decentralization, by 
contrast, only this last term approaches significance, and the other three are not. This implies 
Education
1 2 3
Education expenditure 0.00254 *** -0.00046 -0.01329 *
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0064)
Woreda decentralization 20.76349 *** -0.22921 -22.52787 *
     dummy (5.2258) (3.3025) (11.4241)
Trend 3.93361 *** 5.41707 ***
(0.4641) (0.8453)
Education expenditure x 0.01178 *
    decentralization dummy (0.0058)
constant 30.42987 *** 9.88411 *** 15.93700 ***
(2.9859) (2.7265) (3.8791)
R-squared 0.8610 0.9773 0.9828
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 18 18 18
*,**,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
OLS estimations; standard errors in parentheses
Net Enrollment Rate (NER)
weakly that decentralized expenditure might improve the DPT vaccination rate, as distinct from 
health expenditure more generally, or other aspects of decentralization. But the evidence is at 
best suggestive. Columns 4-6 provide similar results for the measles vaccination rate. Once 
again, health expenditure is significant in the first model but the decentralization dummy is not, 
and de-trending the data does not change this (columns 4-5). When we add the interaction term 
(column 6), however, the results mirror those for education. Decentralized expenditure appears 
as the strong driver of improvements in Ethiopia's measles vaccinations, as distinct from health 
expenditures more generally, or other aspects of decentralization. 
Table 3: Decentralization’s effect on health outputs 
 
Fertility is a different sort of health indicator. As opposed to vaccination rates, which are 
direct outputs of government policy and can be directly influenced by government decisions, 
fertility is a substantive outcome of interest in any population. But fertility decisions are in the 
gift of mating couples, and only indirectly affected by policy. As a demographic variable, 
fertility commonly changes much more slowly year by year, across countries, cultures, and 
Health
1 2 3 4 5 6
Health expenditure 0.00591 ** 0.00936 ** -0.10810 0.00812 *** 0.00907 ** -0.13535 **
(-0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0715) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0613)
Woreda decentralization 1.07761 12.70117 -49.31069 -0.69042 2.53872 -73.70757 **
     dummy (6.4351) (10.3539) (38.9754) (5.6393) (9.5665) (33.4155)
Trend -1.70519 1.58259 -0.47372 3.56875 *
(1.2102) (2.3068) (1.1182) (1.9778)
Education expenditure x 0.11135 0.13691 **
    decentralization dummy (0.0677) (0.0580)
constant 38.54104 *** 46.72068 *** 69.52584 *** 35.87509 *** 38.14747 *** 66.18742 ***
(3.6858) (6.8225) (15.3104) (3.2300) (6.3036) (13.1264)
R-squared 0.3639 0.4341 0.5206 0.5519 0.5569 0.6767
Prob > F 0.0214 0.0247 0.0198 0.0011 0.0039 0.0013
N 20 20 20 20 20 20
*,**,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
OLS estimations; standard errors in parentheses
DPT Vaccination Rate Measles Vaccination Rate
regions of the world. This makes this a more ambitious test of the effects of decentralization. 
Hence we are wary of finding any effect of decentralization on fertility, which – even if 
significant – we would expect to be small. 
What does the evidence show? Table 4 provides the results of our estimations. As for our 
education results, both the health expenditure and decentralization dummy variables are 
associated with decreasing fertility (column 1). The trend variable is also significant (column 2), 
but unlike all of the other education and health models, adding this does not reduce the 
significance of the other two variables. But when we add the interaction term (column 3), only 
the trend variable remains significant. We interpret this as weak evidence that health expenditure 
and decentralization broadly construed contributed to falling fertility levels in Ethiopia. 
Table 4: Decentralization’s effect on health outcomes 
 
Stepping back from the detail, these results are broadly what the theory of 
decentralization would predict. They imply that decentralization is improving performance of the 
public education and health sectors, specifically by raising enrollments in Ethiopia’s schools and 
Health
1 2 3
Health expenditure -0.00041 *** -0.00015 *** -0.00011
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0006)
Woreda decentralization -0.87300 *** -0.26937 *** -0.24898
     dummy (0.1348) (0.0665) (0.2946)
Trend -0.09698 *** -0.09814 ***
(0.0081) (0.0182)
Education expenditure x -0.00004
    decentralization dummy (0.0005)
constant 6.88965 *** 7.33326 *** 7.32593 ***
(0.0743) (0.0442) (0.1126)
R-squared 0.9304 0.9933 0.9933
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 19 19 19
OLS estimations; standard errors in parentheses
*,**,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
Fertility Rate
increasing the rate of vaccination against measles.  The main channel for this appears to be local 
decisions over decentralized expenditures. But we must remember that the data on which these 
results are based are still incomplete, at a higher level of aggregation then we would like, and 
probably still contain errors. Further work with more, and more detailed, data is required. 
Post-Decentralization	Woreda	Expenditures:	Education	
A large share of local government resources are used to hire primary school teachers. 
According to the Demographic and Health Survey, between 2005 and 2011 the primary net 
enrollment rate increased from 68 percent to 82 percent, and the primary completion rate rose 
from 34 to 49 percent. (Secondary education expenditure is split between woredas and regions, 
and so has not yet been included in the analysis.)  We focus here on the association between 
woreda level per capita education expenditures on enrolment rates, and pupil-teacher ratios. We 
do not consider non-salary recurrent costs in education, which come from other levels of 
government15; but this may not matter since in basic education teacher costs are more than 90% 
of total recurrent costs.  We also consider impact of the capital costs such as school buildings 
which can drive enrolments.  Capital expenditure is based on per capita expenditures at the 
regional level, since most capital spending is done there. The data is cross time pooled data, and 
a variable for time was included to isolate the time series effects from other effects. Other control 
variables were percent rural and ethnicity of the woreda (which is a good proxy for historical 
lags in development). The results in Table 5 are from the log-linear regressions, which we 
consider to be best form because they eliminate the effects of extreme values and allow for 
declining returns to scale.  Linear regressions and quadratic regressions were also estimated but 
not reported here.  They are in Annex B. 
                                               
15 For example education quality is supported under GEQIP (General Education Quality Improvement 
Project funded by the Government, World Bank, DFID, USAID and many others. 
Table 5: Effect of Log of Per Capita Education Expenditure on Log of Education 
Outcomes 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Indicator 
Coefficient/(SE) Significance 
 Log of Expenditure Log of Net 
Enrollment Rate 
0.2705 
(.0281) 
*** 
Log of Pupil-
Teacher Ratio 
-0.2242 
(.0203) 
*** 
Notes: Based on Cross-time pooled dataset from 2008-2011. Standard errors given in parenthesis. Significance is defined as: 
*** at 1% level. Number of Observations: 2583 for NER and 2695 for PTR. 
 
The study considered two education-related indicators – the Net Enrollment Rate (NER) 
and Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR). For both, there is a strong significant relationship with woreda-
level per capita recurrent expenditure, when controlling for the effects of rural/urban percentage 
and ethnicity. Table 5 presents the main coefficients of interest from our regression analysis.  For 
every additional Ethiopia Birr per capita in woreda education spending, NER increases by 
0.20%. These results are all significant at the 1% level, as well as robust to changes in 
specification. Similar results are seen with the PTR.  
Post-Decentralization	Woreda	Expenditures:	Health		
Table 6: Effect of Log of Per Capita Health Expenditure on Health Outcomes 
 Indicator Coefficient/(SE) Significance 
Log of Expenditure Log of Penta 3 
vaccinations 
-0.0611 
(0.0271) 
** 
Log of Penta 3 
vaccinations on 
expenditure lagged 
one year 
0.1050 
(.0370) 
*** 
Log of Antenatal 
Care 
0.0784 
(0.0341) 
** 
Log of 
Contraceptive 
Acceptance Rate 
-0.0250 
(0.0404) 
NS 
Log of 
Contraceptive 
Acceptance on 
expenditure lagged 
one year 
0.1373 
(.0487) 
*** 
Log of Deliveries 
by Skilled Birth 
Attendants 
0.2438 
(0.0732) 
*** 
Notes: Based on cross-time pooled dataset from 2008-2011. Standard errors given in parenthesis. Significance is defined as: 
*** at 1% level and ** at 5%  level. Number of Observations: 1,664 for Penta 3, 2,277 for ANC, 2,243 for Contraceptive 
acceptance rate and 2,154 for Deliveries by skilled birth attendants. 
 
Another significant share of local resources is used for health, mainly for hiring frontline 
community health workers called health extension workers (HEWs). HEWs do not provide 
extensive curative services. Their main purpose is threefold: to promote behavioral change 
leading to the adoption of healthy lifestyle practices among members in their community; to act 
as a referral mechanism for complicated cases, such as difficult pregnancies or severe child 
malnutrition, to be brought to a Health Center for treatment by trained health professionals; and 
to provide periodically schedulable services, the most important among them are immunization, 
family planning (insertion of contraceptive implants) and antenatal care. Regarding maternal 
health, HEWs are supposed to mobilize women to seek skilled care by “Skilled Birth 
Attendants”. This title is reserved for nurses, health officers, trained midwives and physicians. 
While taking up a smaller percentage of expenditure, these positions are nonetheless funded from 
the local level budget.   
This study considered the association of expenditure on four health-related outcomes – 
the Penta3 vaccination rate, percentage of pregnant women who received Antenatal Care (ANC), 
Contraceptive Acceptance Rate (CAR), and percentage of Deliveries by Skilled Birth Attendants 
(DelSBA). Each is directly related to local-level health expenditure. Table 6 presents the results. 
As for education, the data is cross time pooled data and variable for time was also included to 
isolate the time series effects from other effects. Other control variables were per capita capital 
expenditures (at the regional level) percent rural and ethnicity of the woreda (which is a good 
proxy for historical lags in development. The results in Table 6 are from the log-linear 
regressions, which we consider best form because it eliminates the effects of extreme values and 
allows for declining returns to scale.  Linear regressions and quadratic regressions were also 
estimated, and are reported in the Annex. 
The results show that increased health expenditures by woredas improve rates of Penta 3 
vaccinations, women receiving antenatal care, contraceptive use, and deliveries by SBAs.  All of 
these results are significant at the 1% level, and all are robust to changes in specification. Again 
as for education, we only consider per capita woreda level spending which covers health 
extension workers and health center staff. Non-salary and capital costs are not covered, but 
clearly can also impact final results. HEWs can convince mothers to immunize their children, but 
the immunization must also be available; these are financed separately. 
All of these indicators are directly related to the responsibilities of HEWs, where the 
majority of local level recurrent health expenditure is directed. In terms of vaccination rates, 
HEWs are the frontline workers meant to mobilize the community during immunization 
campaigns. They also are the first source for pregnant women to seek ANC services, as well as 
being the primary spokespeople informing the community of the importance of contraception in 
family planning. While not technically “skilled birth attendants”, their focus on referral of 
pregnancies to those professionals in health centers impacts the proportion of women who are 
able to give birth with a trained provider. 
A smaller percentage of local health expenditure is directed to the health center level. By 
federal mandate, each of the 3,000 health centers is supposed to be staffed by one to three health 
officers, depending on the characteristics of the host community. Each health officer is backed 
up by a team of about four nurses. There is also at least one trained midwife at each health 
center.  While each of the indicators assessed could be subject to a mixture of influences between 
HEWs and health center staff, the majority of the effect  for all except deliveries by skilled birth 
attendant would be expected to come from HEWs. Deliveries by SBAs would be influenced 
more equally by both HEWs and health center staff. 
Post-Decentralization	Woreda	Expenditures:	Agriculture		
Ethiopia relies heavily on agriculture. It comprises almost half of the country’s GDP and 
employs around 80% of its people.  The government and donors support the agriculture sector by 
financing recurrent costs at woreda level. The majority of these costs are directed towards the 
employment of development agents (DAs). DAs are trained workers who provide extension 
services by teaching community members the benefits of improved farming techniques. Such 
techniques can include the use of improved seeds and fertilizer, and the importance of irrigation 
and erosion prevention, among others. 
Association	of	Extension	Services	with	Productivity	
As in health and education, agricultural expenditure increased rapidly between 2008 and 
2011. Concomitant with this increase, the percentage of fields that use extension services has 
more than doubled.  When cross-time pooled regressions are run on agricultural data between 
2008 and 2011, there is a significant effect of zonal agriculture expenditure on a variety of 
improved farming techniques (Table 7). The regressions control for the same aspects as those for 
health and education – the percentage of the population that is rural, and the ethnic composition 
of the zone. Here the deviation in rainfall for both the current and previous year from the average 
rainfall between 1996 and 2011 at zonal level is also included as a predictor. In all regressions 
where an agricultural variable is included on the left-hand side, both the current year’s as well as 
the previous year’s deviation from average rainfall is a significant predictor.  
Table 7: Effect of One birr per Capita spending on Agriculture Extension workers on 
usage of Farmers’ Extension Services 
Indicator  Coefficient/(SE) Significance 
Field using Extension Services 0.0008 
(0.0004) 
** 
Field using Improved Seeds 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
* 
Field using Fertilizer 0.0007 
(0.0003) 
** 
Notes: Based on Probit models. Cross-time pooled data drawn from Agricultural Sample Survey data from 2008-2011, pooled at 
zonal level. Number of observations: 191. Controls include current and previous years’ deviations from average rainfall 
(calculated as the average between 1996 and 2011), zonal poverty rate, percentage of the zone’s population that is rural, and the 
same ethnic groupings as used in the regressions above. Standard errors given in parenthesis. Significance is defined as: ** at 5% 
level and * at 10% level.  
 
Although the effects appear to be relatively small, the results show that for several 
aspects of improved farming techniques there are significant and positive associations with zonal 
per capita agriculture spending. For every additional USD 1 per capita spent, for example, the 
probability that a field in that zone will benefit from extension services increases by about 0.2% 
(assuming and exchange rate of ETB20/USD). Specifically, usage of fertilizer and improved 
seeds has smaller coefficients but remain positively significant. Irrigation is one technique that is 
not associated with higher agriculture spending. This could be due to higher capital costs 
associated with irrigating fields, and would therefore be dependent more on a particular zone’s 
expenditure in the water sector. 
 
Figure 9: Quantity of Production (quintales) by Crop Type, 2011
 
   Notes: Other includes hops and chat. The chart does not include sugar, which is not often grown on  
                          private land. 
 
Figure 9 shows the overall basket of crops produced by Ethiopian private farmers in 2011 
by production quantity, measured in quintales. Cereals, which include barley, teff, wheat, 
sorghum, maize, oats, and rice, make up almost three-quarters of production. A further 15% 
consists of pulses (e.g. beans, chick peas and lentils) and root crops (e.g. potatoes, carrots and 
onions).  Enset, fruit crops and coffee, which are more geographically confined, represent a 
smaller proportion of overall production. 
The overall objective of agriculture spending is to increase the productivity of farmers’ 
fields. Productivity is measured by yield, which is the ratio of quintals produced per hectare of 
land cultivated. Cross-time pooled regressions between 2008 and 2011, with the log of yield of a 
specific category of crop as the dependent variable, show strong positive relationships with log 
per capita recurrent agricultural spending and crop yields. The control variables were  - the 
percentage of the population that is rural, the zone’s overall poverty rate, the deviation of the 
zone’s rainfall for the current and past year from the average, and ethnic composition (this latter 
variable helps account for geographical heterogeneity in crops’ production).   
Of the eight groups of crops grown in Ethiopia, five show positive and significant 
relationships with agricultural spending (table 8). These five represent about 85% of the 
production in the country. These results, combined with the effect of agriculture spending on 
extension services given above, imply that local agricultural investment is playing an important 
role in increasing farmer productivity levels. A caveat here is the role is only catalytic because 
the actual productivity increase depends on a range of the private and public spending as well as 
investments in infrastructure, which are not included here.  
 
Table 8: Association of Log of Per Capita spending on Agriculture Extension workers 
with Yield 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable/Indicator (Yield 
in Quintales/Hectare) 
Coefficient/(SE) Significance 
Log Linear Regression Estimates 
Log of Expenditure Log of Cereal yield 0.128 
(0.0257) 
*** 
Log of Pulses Yield 0.020 
(0.0455) 
NS 
Log of Root Crops yield 0.320 
(0.1080) 
NS 
Log of  Vegetables yield 0.583 
(0.0674) 
*** 
Log of Oilseeds yield -0.118 
(0.0851) 
NS 
Log of Enset Yield 2.397 
(0.2315) 
*** 
Log of Fruits Yield 1.791 
(0.1360) 
*** 
Log of Coffee Yield 1.267 
(0.1302) 
*** 
Notes: Cross-time pooled data drawn from Agricultural Sample Survey data from 2008-2011, pooled at zonal level. Number 
of observations: 167 for cereals, 159 for pulses, 152 for root crops, 167 for vegetables, 151 for oilseeds, 90 for enset, 162 for 
fruits and 137 for coffee. Standard errors given in parenthesis. Significance is defined as: *** at 1% level and NS is not 
significant. 
 
5. Conclusions 
National evidence presented here suggests that decentralization is improving the performance 
of Ethiopia’s public education and health services, specifically by raising school enrollments and 
increasing the rate of vaccination against measles.  The main channel for these changes appears to be 
local decisions over decentralized expenditures. But we must remember that the data on which these 
results are based are still incomplete, at a higher level of aggregation then we would like, and 
probably still contain errors. Further work with more, and more detailed, data is required. 
Disaggregated, woreda-level data from a shorter period in the post-decentralization period 
confirm these results in much greater detail.  Decentralized expenditures in education, health and 
agriculture is associated with increases in the net enrollment rate, pupil teacher ratio, Penta 3 
vaccinations, percentage of women receiving antenatal care, contraceptive acceptance rate, and the 
percentage of deliveries by skilled birth attendants.  Our estimates imply that an incremental dollar of 
local expenditure has significant real effects, on the order of a 3.6% increase in the net enrollment 
rate, or an 11.3% increase in deliveries by skilled birth attendants.  And in agriculture, decentralized 
expenditure increases the probability that farmers use improved agricultural methods.  This, in turn, 
increases yields in Cereals, Vegetables, Enset, Fruits and Coffee; effects for other crops are 
insignificant. 
It is difficult to overstate the difficulty of doing subnational empirical work on Ethiopia. 
Creating the database required for this report has required a huge amount of work and improvisation 
on the part of the research team.  A major output of this study is the production of a standardized 
database of woreda-level expenditures and characteristics, which will be made public.  The data will 
be combined with new data coming from ongoing data collection financed by donors, and will also 
be used to prepare future studies in this line of research. It is our hope that this dataset will in time 
become a useful tool for researchers and students elsewhere in Africa and beyond. 
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Annex 1: Data Summary 
 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Outcome
Net enrollment rate 18 52.43 20.53 19 79
DPT vaccination 20 45.80 13.43 27 65
Measles vaccination 20 44.75 14.02 22 68
Fertility rate 19 6.10 0.79 5 7
Expenditure
Education expenditures 20 3783.70 3934.14 628 14182
Health expenditures 20 1136.15 1309.77 229 5025
Education expenditure x woreda decentralization 20 3232.85 4339.50 0 14182
     dummy
Health expenditure x woreda decentralization 20 962.10 1425.15 0 5025
     dummy
Trend 21 11.00 6.20 1 21
Woreda decentralization dummy 21 0.52 0.51 0 1
Annex 2: Detailed Regression Results from Post-Decentralization Woreda Database 
 
Stage 1: Education   
 Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.045 
(0.0091) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 174.331 
(1580.6640) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -12.283* 
(6.7861) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -7.387 
 (24.1886) 
 
   Anyiwak -11.089  
(27.8701) 
 
   Gumuz -16.048  
(24.4713) 
 
   Konso -48.182  
(44.7173) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -0.967 
(7.2677 ) 
 
   Somalie -62.222*** 
(10.1186) 
 
   Affar 77.755*** 
(11.4409) 
 
   Other Small -13.178  
(8.5432) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -3.548*** 
(1.2457) 
 
   T one -4.863*** 
(.9834) 
 
   T two -0.301 
(0.6894) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 104.449*** 
(9.4504) 
 
 Quadratic Regression   
 Dependent variable: Net Enrollment Rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.025  
(0.0223) 
 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared -0.00005 
(0.00003) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 55.277  
(1583.27) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -10.394  
(6.8810) 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -8.569 
 (24.1212) 
 
   Anyiwak -13.453 
 (27.8232) 
 
   Gumuz -18.196 
 (24.4323) 
 
   Konso -48.041  
(44.5685) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -1.193 
(7.2454 ) 
 
   Somalie -61.075*** 
(10.1151) 
 
   Affar -77.279*** 
(11.4079) 
 
   Other Small -13.489 
(8.5172) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -2.438* 
(1.4520) 
 
   T one -3.952*** 
(1.1585) 
 
   T two 0.087 
(0.7375) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 100.071*** 
(9.8686) 
 
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Log Net Enrollment Rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.270***  
(0.0280) 
 
  Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -35.212  
(23.2644) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 0.120 
(0.0830) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -0.168 
 (0.2855) 
 
   Anyiwak -0.545* 
 (0.3307) 
 
   Gumuz -0.316 
 (0.2900) 
 
   Konso -0.452 
 (0.5269) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. 0.026  
(0.0859 ) 
 
   Somalie -0.923***  
(0.1215) 
 
   Affar -1.619*** 
(0.1357) 
 
   Other Small -0.145  
(0.1007) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero 0.098*** 
(0.0236) 
 
   T one 0.059*** 
(0.0185) 
 
   T two 0.041  
(0.0111) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 3.039*** 
(0.1906) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
  
 
Linear Regression 
  
 Dependent variable: Pupil-Teacher Ratio   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.024  
(0.0199) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 8000.899*** 
(2800.951) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 15.676  
(4.7215) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -3.408 
 (13.6348) 
 
   Anyiwak -32.619* 
(17.6828) 
 
   Gumuz -21.557 
 (14.7049) 
 
   Konso -18.551 
 (26.2358) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -15.588***  
(4.1635 ) 
 
   Somalie 39.245*** 
(6.1928) 
 
   Affar -26.338*** 
(7.1540) 
 
   Other Small -7.671  
(4.7664) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero 6.381** 
(2.6909) 
 
   T one 1.990  
(2.1899) 
   T two 4.038** 
(1.6336) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 43.085*** 
(8.1009) 
 
 Quadratic Regression   
 Dependent variable: Pupil-Teacher Ratio   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.110***  
(0.0403) 
 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared 0.0002** 
(0.00006) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 7472.043*** 
(2805.786) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 12.328**  
(4.9101) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -0.908 
 (13.6528) 
 
   Anyiwak -34.057** 
(17.6673) 
 
   Gumuz -17.969 (14.7562)  
   Konso -18.807 (26.1966)  
   |Hist. Adv. -14.821***  
(4.1692 ) 
 
   Somalie 35.936*** 
(6.3310) 
 
   Affar -28.423*** 
(7.1947) 
 
   Other Small -7.151  
(4.7640) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero 3.476 
(2.9395) 
 
   T one -0.288  
(2.3785) 
 
   T two 3.067* 
(1.6798) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 53.924*** 
(9.2286) 
 
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Pupil-Teacher Ratio   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.224***  
(0.0202) 
 
  Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 85.212*** 
(19.7773) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 0.202*** 
(0.0363) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer 0.139 
 (0.1117) 
 
   Anyiwak -0.718*** 
 (0.1364) 
 
   Gumuz -0.378 
 (0.1189) 
 
   Konso -0.315 
 (0.2126) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -0.238***  
(0.0334 ) 
 
   Somalie 0.122**  
(0.0498) 
 
   Affar -0.618*** 
(0.0582) 
 
   Other Small -0.136***  
(0.0386) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -0.033 
(0.0203) 
 
   T one -0.088*** 
(0.0159) 
 
   T two 0.000  
(0.0106) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 4.914*** 
(0.1251) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
 
Stage 1: Health   
 Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Penta3 Vaccination Rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.063***  
(0.0233) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -1447.151 
(1315.3060) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 8.677***  
(1.8676) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -64.966*** 
(6.4810) 
 
   Anyiwak -53.901*** 
(8.3259) 
 
   Gumuz -44.426*** 
(7.3255) 
 
   Konso -50.230** 
(24.1339) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -9.565***  
(2.0970 ) 
 
   Somalie -51.458*** 
(2.7817) 
 
   Affar -47.295*** 
(3.2447) 
 
   Other Small -13.755*** 
(2.4127) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -9.362*** 
(1.2211) 
 
   T one -3.007** 
(1.2684) 
 
   T two -6.915*** 
(0.8858) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 91.697*** 
(3.1549) 
 
 Quadratic Regression   
 Dependent variable: Penta3 Vaccination Rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.122***  
(0.0395) 
 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared 0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -1431.498 
(1315.529) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 8.152***  
(1.8899) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -64.123*** 
(6.4999) 
 
   Anyiwak -55.78*** 
(8.3911) 
 
   Gumuz -43.354*** 
(7.3510) 
 
   Konso -49.085** 
(24.1561) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -9.581***  
(2.0974 ) 
 
   Somalie -51.333*** 
(2.7833) 
 
   Affar -46.810*** 
(3.2567) 
 
   Other Small -13.546***  
(2.4160) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -9.963***   
(1.2633) 
   T one -3.535***  
(1.2994) 
 
   T two -7.166*** 
(0.8955) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 93.646*** 
(3.3278) 
 
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Penta3 Vaccination Rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.061**  
(0.0270) 
 
  Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -43.230 (37.8668)  
  Percentage of rural population 0.182*** 
(0.0512) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -1.939*** 
 (0.1816) 
 
   Anyiwak -1.048*** 
 (0.2274) 
 
   Gumuz -0.701*** 
 (0.2067) 
 
   Konso -0.592 
 (0.6551) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -0.125**  
(0.0607 ) 
 
   Somalie -1.048***  
(0.0796) 
 
   Affar -1.076*** 
(0.0915) 
 
   Other Small -0.223***  
(0.0694) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -0.193***  
(0.0416) 
 
   T one -0.104** 
(0.0428) 
 
   T two -0.142 *** 
(0.0296) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 4.689*** 
(0.1379) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Antenatal Care   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.026  
(0.0313) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -249.548 
(1711.0580) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -10.849***  
(2.4200) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -56.384*** 
(8.5451) 
 
   Anyiwak -44.982*** 
(10.2385) 
 
   Gumuz -59.973*** 
(9.1047) 
 
   Konso -42.666 (30.2839)  
   |Hist. Adv. -13.034***  
(2.5008 ) 
 
   Somalie -41.722*** 
(3.4255) 
 
   Affar -59.354*** 
(4.0043) 
 
   Other Small -13.486*** 
(2.8967) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -13.198*** 
(1.6319) 
 
   T one -6.886*** 
(1.6671) 
 
   T two -4.589*** 
(1.2176) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 96.300*** 
(4.0269) 
 
 Quadratic Regression   
 Dependent variable: Antenatal Care   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.086  
(0.0532) 
 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -238.134 
(1711.9540) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -10.305***  
(2.4525) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -57.340*** 
(8.5779) 
 
   Anyiwak -43.322*** 
(10.3145) 
 
   Gumuz -61.090*** 
(9.1462) 
 
   Konso -43.918 
 (30.3276) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -13.080***  
(2.5029) 
 
   Somalie -41.852*** 
(3.4293) 
 
   Affar -59.895*** 
(4.0262) 
 
   Other Small -13.747***  
(2.9050) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -12.542***  
(1.6965) 
 
   T one -6.326***  
(1.7131) 
 
   T two -4.323*** 
(1.2316) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 94.305*** 
(4.2712) 
 
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Antenatal Care   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.078**  
(0.0341) 
 
  Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -36.054 
 (47.8480) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.011 
(0.0671) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -2.787*** 
 (0.2403) 
 
   Anyiwak -0.807*** 
 (0.2774) 
 
   Gumuz -1.290*** 
 (0.2545) 
 
   Konso -0.579 
 (0.8457) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -0.156**  
(0.0700 ) 
 
   Somalie -0.901***  
(0.0961) 
 
   Affar -1.839*** 
(0.1127) 
 
   Other Small -0.237***  
(0.0813) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -0.232***  
(0.0499) 
 
   T one -0.150*** 
(0.0496) 
 
   T two -0.124 *** 
(0.0350) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 4.249*** 
(0.1706) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Contraceptive Acceptance rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.052*  
(0.0287) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -1371.507 
(1583.1580) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -11.900***  
(2.2773) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -64.900*** 
(7.8045) 
 
   Anyiwak -45.951*** 
(9.5779) 
 
   Gumuz -57.212*** 
(8.3646) 
 
   Konso -10.295  
(28.6759) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -5.363**  
(2.3429) 
 
   Somalie -61.431*** 
(3.302) 
 
   Affar -53.855*** 
(3.7462) 
 
   Other Small -12.126*** 
(2.7181) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -14.651*** 
(1.4963) 
 
   T one -8.743*** 
(1.4947) 
 
   T two -3.260*** 
(1.0739) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 83.648*** 
(3.7609) 
 
 Quadratic Regression   
 Dependent variable: Contraceptive Acceptance rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.012  
(0.0493) 
 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared -0.00023  
(0.0002) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -1351.924 
(1583.894) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -11.527***  
(2.3092) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer 65.492*** 
(7.8317) 
 
   Anyiwak -45.000*** 
(9.6311) 
 
   Gumuz -57.931*** 
(8.4008) 
 
   Konso -11.154  
(28.7083) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -5.396**  
(2.3444) 
 
   Somalie -61.430*** 
(3.3037) 
 
   Affar -54.207*** 
(3.7654) 
 
   Other Small -12.297***  
(2.7251) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -14.187***  
(1.5666) 
 
   T one -8.350***  
(1.5451) 
 
   T two -3.075*** 
(1.0896) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 82.290*** 
(4.0021) 
 
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Contraceptive Acceptance rate   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education -0.025  
(0.0403) 
 
  Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -59.955  
(55.6050) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.124  
(0.0799) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -4.864*** 
 (0.2766) 
 
   Anyiwak -1.777*** 
 (0.3285) 
 
   Gumuz -1.813*** 
 (0.2954) 
 
   Konso -0.111 
 (1.0139) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -0.073  
(0.0828 ) 
 
   Somalie -2.786***  
(0.1169) 
 
   Affar -2.134*** 
(0.1332) 
 
   Other Small -0.325***  
(0.0963) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -0.385***  
(0.0579) 
 
   T one -0.258*** 
(0.0559) 
 
   T two -0.0938** 
(0.0385) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 4.481*** 
(0.2021) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.066***  
(0.0287) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 328.600 
(1211.0980) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -22.745***  
(1.7421) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -15.830*** 
(5.9881) 
 
   Anyiwak -19.264*** 
(7.4207) 
 
   Gumuz -17.340*** 
(6.2405) 
 
   Konso -3.805  
(20.9835) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -4.326**  
(1.7805) 
 
   Somalie -10.021*** 
(2.5271) 
 
   Affar -9.327*** 
(2.8013) 
 
   Other Small -5.143**  
(2.0568) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -3.308*** 
(1.1900) 
 
   T one -4.626*** 
(1.2333) 
 
   T two 1.012  
(0.9168) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 40.980*** 
(2.8922) 
 
 Quadratic Regression   
 Dependent variable: Delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.068*  
(0.0389) 
 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Education Squared -0.00001  
(0.0001) 
 
  Yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure 330.274 
(1211.889) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -22.726***  
(1.7685) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -15.862*** 
(6.0100) 
 
   Anyiwak -19.204** 
(7.4858) 
 
   Gumuz -17.374*** 
(6.2652) 
 
   Konso -3.847 
 (21.0059) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. -4.327**  
(1.7815) 
 
   Somalie -10.024*** 
(2.5288) 
 
   Affar -9.344*** 
(2.8147) 
 
   Other Small -5.152**  
(2.0616) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -3.285***   
(1.2422) 
   T one -4.607***  
(1.2694) 
 
   T two 1.021 
(0.9270) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 40.911*** 
(3.0919) 
 
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Delivery by Skilled Birth Attendant   
 Independent variables: OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Education 0.243***  
(0.0732) 
 
  Log yearly regional per capita Capital Expenditure -72.666  
(98.6972) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.705***  
(0.1456) 
 
  Ethnicity controls   
   Nuwer -2.556*** 
 (0.5012) 
 
   Anyiwak -2.182*** 
 (0.5980) 
 
   Gumuz -1.106** 
 (0.5242) 
 
   Konso -0.223 
 (1.7985) 
 
   |Hist. Adv. 0.019  
(0.1486) 
 
   Somalie -0.758***  
(0.2109) 
 
   Affar -1.310*** 
(0.2378) 
 
   Other Small -0.186  
(0.1726) 
 
  Time controls   
   T zero -0.123  
(0.1011) 
 
   T one -0.408*** 
(0.0990) 
 
   T two -0.000  
(0.0700) 
 
   T three Omitted 
 
 
  Constant 2.477*** 
(0.3672) 
 
Probit regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses; Predicted probabilities with unconditional 
standard errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
 
 
 Stage 1: Agriculture   
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Cereal Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.128*** 
 (0. 0489) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.414* 
 (0.2205) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.000 
 (0.0008) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 0.001**  
(0.0007) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.002***  
(0.0007) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray 4.576  
(9.0103) 
 
   Afar 3.544 
 (8.5370) 
 
   Amhara 3.522 
 (8.9863) 
 
   Oromia 3.951 
 (8.9503) 
 
   Somali 11.307  
(9.2046) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz 17.258  
(18.0467) 
 
   SNNP 3.502 
 (8.9883) 
 
   Gambella Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF 0.000  
(0.0009) 
 
   Afar x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0009) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0008) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF -0.010***  
(0.0027) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF -0.011 
 (0.0128) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0008) 
 
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate -0.020 
(0.0182) 
 
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.003 
 (0.0058) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate 0.002 
 (0.0063) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate -0.078***  
(0.0200) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate -0.036  
(0.0438) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate 0.000 
 (0.0025) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate 0.102  
(0.2498) 
 
  Constant  -1.510  
(8.9315) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Pulses Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture -0.020 
 (0.0645) 
 
  Percentage of rural population 0.105 
 (0.2456) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.001 
 (0.0014) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 0.001  
(0.0010) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.001 
(0.0010) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray 3.165  
(2.126) 
 
   Afar 0.918 
 (1.1132) 
 
   Amhara 2.115 
 (1.9126) 
 
   Oromia 3.184* 
 (1.8845) 
 
   Somali 3.569  
(3.0569) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz 39.151* (20.4730)  
   SNNP 2.462  
 (1.9117) 
   Gambella Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF -0.001  
(0.0015) 
 
   Afar x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0014) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF -0.001 
 (0.0014) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF -0.002  
(0.0036) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF -0.030* 
 (0.0166) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF -0.001 
 (0.0014) 
 
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate -0.012  
(0.0196) 
 
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.008 
 (0.0063) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate -0.010 
 (0.0070) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate -0.027  
(0.0265) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate -0.126**  
(0.0563) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate 0.002 
 (0.0027) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
  Constant  -0.213  
(1.8785) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Root Crop Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.320 
 (0.2266) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.082 
 (0.7218) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.000 
 (0.0032) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 0.002  
(0.0039) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.010 
(0.0039) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray 0.739  
(5.2598) 
 
   Afar Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara 0.314 
 (4.4270) 
 
   Oromia 0.579 
 (4.4138) 
 
   Somali -1.041  
(5.5139) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz 4.842 
 (43.2237) 
 
   SNNP 0.626 
 (4.4447) 
 
   Gambella Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF 0.000  
(0.0036) 
 
   Afar x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0033) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0033) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF 0.003  
(0.0069) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF -0.003 
 (0.0351) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF 0.000 
 (0.0033) 
 
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate 0.012  
(0.0618) 
 
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.008 
 (0.0170) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate -0.009 
 (0.0211) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate -0.006   
(0.1203) 
   SNNP x Poverty rate -0.016** 
 (0.0074) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
  Constant  2.431  
(4.5185) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Vegetable Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.582*** 
 (0.1330) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.110 
 (0.5548) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.001 
 (0.0021) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 0.001  
(0.0020) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) -0.003 
 (0.0021) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray 32.703  
(22.4893) 
 
   Afar 34.322 
(22.5041) 
 
   Amhara 32.568 
 (22.4326) 
 
   Oromia 33.773 
 (22.3465) 
 
   Somali 10.227  
(22.9840) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz 35.983  
(43.4964) 
 
   SNNP 31.791 
 (22.4365) 
 
   Gambella Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF -0.002  
(0.0024) 
 
   Afar x Avg RF -0.005 
(0.0042) 
 
   Amhara x Avg RF -0.002 
 (0.0022) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF -0.002 
 (0.0021) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF 0.031*** 
(0.0067) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF -0.005 
 (0.0306) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF 0.001 
 (0.0021) 
 
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted 
 
 
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate 0.004  
(0.0618) 
 
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.003 
 (0.0145) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate -0.034** 
 (0.0159) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate 0.185*** 
(0.0490) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate -0.036  
(0.1049) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate -0.004 
 (0.0064) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate 0.919 
(0.6237) 
 
 
  Constant  -29.575  
(22.3062) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Oil seeds Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture -0.118 
 (0.1899) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.229 
 (0.6220) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall -0.008*** 
 (0.0024) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall -0.001  
(0.0034) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) -0.001 
 (0.0036) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray -43.523*  
(25.2816) 
 
   Afar -38.156 
 (24.0540) 
 
   Amhara -42.608* 
(25.2609) 
 
   Oromia -42.904* 
 (25.1993) 
 
   Somali -41.315*  
(24.3306) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz -52.981 
 (44.3822) 
 
   SNNP -44.061* 
(25.2585) 
 
   Gambella Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF 0.008***  
(0.0027) 
 
   Afar x Avg RF Omitted  
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.008*** 
 (0.0025) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF 0.008*** 
 (0.0025) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF 0.017*** 
 (0.0025) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF 0.009*** 
 (0.0025) 
 
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate 0.017  
(0.0450) 
 
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Amhara x Poverty rate 0.001 
 (0.0144) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate 0.007 
 (0.0186) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate 0.012  
(0.1041) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate 0.000 
 (0.7084) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate -1.044* 
(0.7084) 
 
 
  Constant  45.731* 
(25.1903) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Enset Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 2.397*** 
 (0. 5766) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -1.091 
 (1.7449) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.000 
 (0.0011) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 0.010  
(0.0168) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.068*** 
 (0.0157) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray Omitted  
   Afar Omitted  
   Amhara Omitted  
   Oromia 8.654*** 
 (3.0691) 
 
   Somali Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz Omitted  
   SNNP 1.357 
 (1.4055) 
 
   Gambella Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF Omitted  
   Afar x Avg RF Omitted  
   Amhara x Avg RF Omitted  
   Oromia x Avg RF -0.005*** 
 (0.0016) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF Omitted  
   SNNP x Avg RF Omitted  
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Amhara x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Oromia x Poverty rate -0.034 
 (0.0527) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate Omitted  
   SNNP x Poverty rate 0.020*** 
 (4.3094) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate -1.044* 
(0.7084) 
 
 
  Constant  -13.452*** 
(4.3094) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Fruit Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 1.790*** 
 (0.2669) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.794 
 (0.9149) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.000 
 (0.0006) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 0.002  
(0.0048) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.028*** 
 (0.0050) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray -2.459 
(3.3924) 
 
   Afar 4.850* 
(2.8878) 
 
   Amhara -0.309 
(0.9558) 
 
   Oromia 2.933** 
 (1.2536) 
 
   Somali -5.032 
(6.4944) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz -108.598** 
(55.213) 
 
   SNNP Omitted  
   Gambella Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF 0.001 
(0.0019) 
 
   Afar x Avg RF -0.009 
(0.0059) 
 
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.001 
(0.0013) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF -0.002** 
 (0.0008) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF 0.005 
(0.0090) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF 0.087* 
(0.0448) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF Omitted  
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate 0.002 
(0.0665) 
 
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.023 
 (0.0213) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate -0.019 
(0.0267) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate 0.113 
(0.0727) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate 0.288* 
(0.1537) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate 0.014 
 (0.0093) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
  Constant  -4.019*** 
(1.4968) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
    
 Log Linear Regression   
 Dependent variable: Coffee Yield   
 Independent variables:  OLS  
  Log yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 1.267*** 
 (0. 2342) 
 
  Percentage of rural population -0.777 
 (0.7845) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall 0.000 
 (0.0005) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall -0.001  
(0.0048) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall (lagged) 0.029*** 
 (0.0049) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray Omitted  
   Afar Omitted  
   Amhara -0.632  
(0.8110) 
 
   Oromia 2.014* 
 (1.0696) 
 
   Somali 1.43**  
(0.6380) 
 
   Beneshangul Gemuz -18.760  
(46.6977) 
 
   SNNP Omitted  
   Gambella Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF Omitted  
   Afar x Avg RF Omitted  
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.000 
(0.0011) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF -0.001*** 
 (0.0007) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF 0.014 
(0.0379) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF Omitted  
   Gambella x Avg RF Omitted  
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Afar x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.012 
 (0.0180) 
 
   Oromia x Poverty rate 0.004 
(0.0228) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate Omitted  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate 0.068 
(0.1300) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate 0.007 
 (0.0082) 
 
   Gambella x Poverty rate Omitted 
 
 
  Constant  -4.095*** 
(1.3591) 
 
Cross-time pooled regressions with robust standard errors; standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
Dire Dawa and Hara omitted due to small scale of agriculture in these regions 
 
Stage 3: Agriculture 
  
 Dependent variable: Any Improved Technique, 2011   
 Independent variables:  Probit Predicted 
Probability 
  Yearly expenditure per capita in Agriculture 0.0033 
(0.00029) 
 
  Poverty rate 0.0075** 
(0.00295) 
 
  Rainfall controls   
   Average rainfall -0.00078*** 
(0.00007) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 2011 -0.00306*** 
(0.00046) 
 
   Deviation from average rainfall 2010 0.0090*** 
(0.00043) 
 
  Regional dummies   
   Tigray omitted  
   Afar -5.1478*** 
(0.58951) 
 
   Amhara -2.8538*** 
(0.13734) 
 
   Oromia -0.02614 
(0.14042) 
 
   Somali -1.1050 (2.79749)  
   Beneshangul Gemuz -28.8422*** 
(5.38058) 
 
   SNNP -0.9599 (0.14272)  
   Gambella 40.0622  
- 
 
  Regional dummies x Average rainfall   
   Tigray x Avg RF omitted  
   Afar x Avg RF omitted  
   Amhara x Avg RF 0.0031*** 
(0.00007) 
 
   Oromia x Avg RF -0.00001 
(0.00007) 
 
   Somali x Avg RF -0.0025 (0.00408)  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Avg RF 0.0234*** 
(0.00434) 
 
   SNNP x Avg RF 0.0005*** 
(0.00008) 
 
   Gambella x Avg RF 0.0022*** 
0.00066 
 
  Regional dummies x Poverty rate   
   Tigray x Poverty rate omitted  
   Afar x Poverty rate 0.1298*** 
(0.01668) 
 
   Amhara x Poverty rate -0.0027 (0.00304)  
   Oromia x Poverty rate -0.0207*** 
(0.00307) 
 
   Somali x Poverty rate -0.0016 (0.02692)  
   Beneshangul Gemuz x Poverty rate 0.0446*** 
(0.01563) 
 
   SNNP x Poverty rate -0.0010 (0.00298)  
   Gambella x Poverty rate -1.4040  
- 
 
  Quintile    
   Smallest/Poorest omitted 0.0003*** 
(0.00002) 
   Second/Poorer 0.0445*** 
(0.01386) 
0.0003*** 
(0.00003) 
   Middle/Middle 0.3727*** 
(0.01282) 
0.0005*** 
(0.00004) 
   Fourth/Richer 0.5961*** 
(0.01265) 
0.0006*** 
(0.00005) 
   Largest/Richest 0.8211*** 
(0.01280) 
0.0008*** 
(0.00007) 
  Constant  -1.7225*** 
(0.15902) 
 
 
 
